Program
Sunday, 26 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
15:30 - 16:30 | Registration. |
16:30 - 17:15 | Welcome. |
17:15 - 18:30 | Welcome Lecture: What is Mathematical Philosophy? (Stephan Hartmann & Hannes Leitgeb, MCMP). |
Monday, 27 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
08:00 - 09:00 | Registration. |
09:00 - 10:15 | Elementary Logic (Florian Steinberger & Gil Sagi, MCMP). |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 12:00 | Tutorial for 'Elementary Logic'. |
12:00 - 13:30 | Lunch Break (on your own). |
13:30 - 14:45 | Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory (Catrin Campbell-Moore & Sebastian Lutz, MCMP). |
14:45 - 15:15 | Break. |
15:15 - 16:30 | Tutorial for 'Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory'. |
16:30 - 17:00 | Break. |
17:00 - 18:15 |
Parallel PhD/PostDoc-conducted Sessions: 1: Disagreement and Belief Revision (Lee Elkin, MCMP). 2: Self-Referential Probability (Catrin Campbell-Moore, MCMP). 3: Philosophical Foundations for Statistical Inference: Bayesianism vs. Frequentism (Conor Mayo-Wilson, University of Washington/MCMP). 4: Philosophical Foundations of Imprecise Probability (Seamus Bradley, MCMP). 5: Using Computational Tools to Solve Problems in Mathematical Philosophy (Branden Fitelson, Rutgers). |
Tuesday, 28 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
09:00 - 10:15 | Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). (Watch the lecture @ LMUcast) |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 12:00 | Tutorial for 'Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence'. |
12:00 - 13:30 | Lunch Break (on your own). |
13:30 - 14:45 | Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). (Watch the lecture @ LMUcast) |
14:45 - 15:15 | Break. |
15:15 - 16:30 | Tutorial for 'Simulations in Philosophy'. |
16:30 - 17:00 | Break. |
17:00 - 18:15 | Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). (Watch the lecture @ LMUcast) |
Wednesday, 29 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
09:00 - 10:15 | Tutorial for 'Context-dependence and the Semantics-pragmatics Interface'. |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 12:00 | Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). |
12:00 - 13:30 | Lunch Break (on your own). |
13:30 - 14:45 | Tutorial for 'Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence'. |
14:45 - 15:15 | Break. |
15:15 - 16:30 | Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). |
16:30 - 17:00 | Break. |
17:00 - 18:15 | Tutorial for 'Simulations in Philosophy'. |
19:00 - 20:30 | Evening lecture: Prioritizing Epistemic Arguments for Justice in the Academy (Carla Fehr, University of Waterloo). (Watch the lecture @ LMUcast) |
Thursday, 30 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
09:00 - 10:15 | Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 12:00 | Tutorial for 'Context-dependence and the Semantics-pragmatics Interface'. |
12:00 - 13:30 | Lunch Break (on your own). |
13:30 - 14:45 |
Parallel Sessions: Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). |
15:15 - 18:15 | Excursion. (Waldwirtschaft) |
Friday, 31 July
Time | Topic |
---|---|
09:00 - 10:15 |
Parallel Sessions: Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 12:00 |
Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). |
12:00 - 13:30 | Lunch Break (on your own). |
13:30 - 14:45 |
Parallel Sessions: Lecture Stream 1: Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence (Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis). Lecture Stream 2: Networks in Philosophy (Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University). Lecture Stream 3: Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface (Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Insitute, Paris). |
14:45 - 15:15 | Break. |
15:15 - 17:00 | Student Poster Sessions. |
17:00 - 17:15 | Break. |
17:15 - 18:30 |
Parallel PhD/PostDoc-conducted Sessions: 1: Non-classical Probability Spaces in Quantum Mechanics (Radin Dadarshti, MCMP). 2: Conceptual Spaces and Inductive Logic (Marta Sznajder, MCMP). 4: Confirmation and Calibration in Bayesianism and Model Selection Theory (Charlotte Werndl, University of Salzburg). |
19:00 | Summer School Dinner. (Cafe Reitschule) |
Saturday, 1 August
Time | Topic |
---|---|
09:15 - 09:45 | Student Presentation: Grounding in Bolzano’s Purely Analytic Proof (Pauline van Wierst, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa). |
09:45 - 10:15 | Student Presentation: Dialetheism (Katherine Valde, Boston University). |
10:15 - 10:45 | Break. |
10:45 - 11:15 | Student Presentation: Changing perspectives on Sleeping Beauty (Silvia Milano, London School of Economics). |
11:15 - 11:45 | Student Presentation: Making Manipulation Sincere (Kamilla Buchter, London School of Economics). |
11:45 - 12:00 | Wrap Up & Closing. |
Abstracts
Making Manipulation Sincere
Kamilla Buchter, London School of Economics
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states that every desirable voting procedure can be manipulated. We will therefore never know if a ballot result reflects peoples’ true preferences. Is this a problem for democracy? According to Martin van Hees and Keith Dowding the answer is “No!” I show that their argument cannot substantiate this conclusion. It does however enable us to defend plurality rule as a desirable voting procedure. I end the talk by considering the pros and cons of using mathematics to answer philosophical issues.top
Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory
Catrin Campbell-Moore and Sebastian Lutz, MCMP
This introductory lecture provides an overview of basic algebra and set theory that will serve as the basis for the main lecture streams on individual and collective decision theory, agent-based modeling, and epistemic logic. We will introduce the idea of a variable, algebraic operations on variables, and some basic set theory, e.g. union, complementation, domains, ranges, and functions. We will also give an introduction into basic probability theory, such as the characteristics of stochastic variables and independence of stochastic variables, among other issues.
Prioritizing Epistemic Arguments for Justice in the Academy
Carla Fehr, University of Waterloo
White women, and men and women who are members of some racialized groups are underrepresented in many areas of academic research. In addition to the ethical benefits of addressing this problem and improving diversity within our research communities, I have argued that there are also positive epistemic outcomes of this work. In other words, I have argued that improving diversity generally results in better research. In this paper I explore the relationship between these ethical and epistemic approaches, and conclude that significant ethical benefits arise from focusing on epistemic arguments for improving diversity in our universities.
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Changing perspectives on Sleeping Beauty
Silvia Milano, London School of Economics
In this paper, I argue that Lewis’ and Elga’s solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem share a common conceptual mistake, caused by an unwarranted application of what Elga calls a “restricted principle of indifference” (RPI). I introduce the idea that we should distinguish between two senses in which centred events may have the “same probability”. This implies that whether Beauty should be a halfer or a thirder depends on the perspective from which she considers the problem. I conclude by evaluating how the distinction between different “agent perspectives” changes the interpretations of probability that might be available to us, and how it might be usefully extended to other problems.top
Elementary Logic
Gil Sagi and Florian Steinberger, MCMP
The aim of this tutorial is to equip the students of the summer school with the necessary logical and set-theoretic tools to ensure their successful participation in the specialized tutorials. We begin with a review of the key notions of propositional and first-order logic (validity, logical consequence, derivability, soundness, and completeness). The second half of the tutorial is devoted to elementary set-theoretic concepts (sets, relations, functions). If time permits, we will end by introducing modal logic.top
Attitudes in Epistemology: Belief vs. Credence
Julia Staffel, Washington University in St. Louis
This lecture stream is intended to be an introduction to some central topics in formal epistemology. Formal epistemology is a relatively recent branch of epistemology, which uses formal tools such as logic and probability theory in order to answer questions about the nature of rational belief. An important feature that distinguishes formal epistemology from traditional epistemology is not just its use of formal tools, but also its understanding of the nature of belief. Traditional epistemology tends to focus almost exclusively on what is called ‘outright belief’, where the options considered are just belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. By contrast, it is widely accepted among formal epistemologists that this conception of belief is too coarse-grained to capture the rich nature of our doxastic attitudes. They posit that humans also have degrees of belief, or credences, which can take any value between full certainty that something is true, and certainty that it is false. The shift in focus towards degrees of belief has generated a rich research program, parts of which integrate with issues in traditional epistemology, and parts of which are specific to the debate about degrees of belief. Important questions in the field are for example: How are degrees of belief related to outright beliefs? What constraints are there on rational degrees of belief, and how can they be defended? How can we adequately represent degrees of belief in a formal framework? How do ideal epistemological norms bear on what non-ideal agents like us ought to believe? The results of these debates are relevant for many areas of philosophy besides epistemology, such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and practical reasoning.top
Context-dependence and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface
Isidora Stojanovic, Jean Nicod Institute, Paris
Context-dependence is ubiquitous not only in language, but in cognition and action more generally. In the first part of the course, we shall introduce two basic tools from formal semantics (and pragmatics) that help understanding how the truth of a statement may depend on the context: on the one hand, the notion of presupposition, and on the other, possible world semantics, with its extensions and applications to modality, tense and doxastic expressions. In the second part, we shall use these tools to address a range of issues at the semantics-pragmatics interface, such as the relationship between alethic, deontic and epistemic modals, or the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions and belief reports.top
Dialetheism
Katherine Valde, Boston University
Dialetheism has been assumed to be a superficially impossible view in western philosophy for two basic reasons: 1) the law of non-contradiction and 2) 'explosion', the idea that from a contradiction anything follows (in classical logic). The development of paraconsistent logics has shown that contradictions need not explode into triviality, and have contributed to the attention dialetheism has received as a serious logical theory. This presentation will explore the philosophical motivations for the development of the dialetheist position, as well as the support provided by various paraconsistent logical systems.top
Grounding in Bolzano’s Purely Analytic Proof
Pauline van Wierst, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa
This talk is about grounding proofs or explanation in mathematics. We will consider Bolzano’s (1817) proof of the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT), which is essentiallythe proof used today. Bolzano held that his proof is a grounding proof, i.e.not only shows that IVT is true, but also why it is true. Unfortunately, it is unclear what this grounding consists in; this is the main question in this talk. We will explore whether Bolzano’s proof provides the objective reason why IVT is true, as opposed to merely subjective reasons, and whether proofs of IVT based on geometric truths are circular.top
Networks in Philosophy
Kevin Zollmann, Carnegie Mellon University
Social networks have become a central feature of the scientific study of social behavior and have been imported into philosophical discussions – like ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science – where social behavior is important. In ethics, scholars have asked what effect social networks might have on the evolution and maintenance of different ethical norms like fairness, cooperation, and altruism. As epistemologists have begun to take the social nature of knowledge more seriously, they too have begun to ask about how networks might influence the way knowledge is generated and transmitted. Finally, in philosophy of science scholars have asked how incorporating networks might change scientific theory, and how networks of scientists might come to learn about the world. This course will introduce students to the basics of social networks, some of the uses of social networks in philosophy, and how to understand and analyze networks for original research. Because some of the analysis of social networks requires the use of computer simulation, this course will also teach students how to use the computational tool NetLogo for analyzing networks. No prior knowledge of programing is expected.