MCMP Summer School Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students 2017
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Program

Room Arrangement

DateAddress, Room
30.07.2017 Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, Room A120
31.07. - 04.08.2017 Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, room numbers in program below
05.08.2017 Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, Room B106

 For further information, have a look at our floor plan (837 Kb).

Sunday, 30 July

TimeTopic
16:45 - 17:45 Registration.
17:45 - 18:00 Welcome.
18:00 - 19:15 Welcome Lecture: What is Mathematical Philosophy? (Stephan Hartmann & Hannes Leitgeb, MCMP).
19:15 Country Taste

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Monday, 31 July

TimeTopic
08:00 - 09:00 Registration. (Room B015)
09:00 - 10:15 Introductory Lecture for Lecture Streams I (TBA, MCMP). (Room C022)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial for 'Introductory Lecture for Lecture Streams I' (TBA, MCMP). (Room C022)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break.
13:30 - 14:45 Introductory Lecture for Lecture Streams II (TBA, MCMP). (Room C022)
14:45 - 15:15 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
15:15 - 16:30 Tutorial for 'Introductory Lecture for Lecture Streams II' (TBA, MCMP). (Room C022)
16:30 - 16:45 Break.
16:45 - 18:00 Parallel MCMP Fellows' Sessions:

1: Neil Dewar: Category Theory. (Room C005)
2: Karolina Krzyżanowska: Where Philosophy of Language and Psychology of Reasoning Meet: The Case of Indicative Conditionals. (Room C009)
3: Patricia Palacios: Philosophical Problems Concerning Phase Transitions. (Room C016)
4: Luis Rosa: Knowledge of Validity. (Room C022)

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Tuesday, 1 August

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break.
13:30 - 14:45 Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C022)
14:45 - 15:15 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
15:15 - 16:30 Tutorial: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C022)
16:30 - 16:45 Break.
16:45 - 18:00 Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C022)

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Wednesday, 2 August

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Tutorial: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C022)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
10:45 - 12:00 Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break.
13:30 - 14:45 Tutorial: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
14:45 - 15:15 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
15:15 - 16:30 Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C022)
16:30 - 16:45 Break.
16:45 - 18:00 Tutorial: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C022)
19:00 - 20:30 Evening Lecture: Intellectual Arrogance and Vanity in Debate and Testimony (Alessandra Tanesini, Cardiff University). (Room B106)

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Thursday, 3 August

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C022)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C022)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break.
13:30 - 14:45 Parallel Sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C016)
Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C005)
15:00 - 16:15 [Optional] Career Workshop (TBA, MCMP). (Room C022)

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Friday, 4 August

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Parallel Sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C016)
Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C005)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
10:45 - 12:00 Parallel Sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C016)
Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C005)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break.
13:30 - 14:45 Parallel Sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning (Katrin Schulz, University of Amsterdam). (Room C022)
Lecture Stream 2: The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts (Juliette Kennedy, University of Helsinki). (Room C016)
Lecture Stream 3: Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference (Roy Cook, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities). (Room C005)
14:45 - 15:15 Coffee Break. (Room B011)
15:15 - 16:30 Parallel MCMP Fellows' Sessions:

1: Marianna Antonutti Marfori: What is Ordinary Mathematics? (Room C005)
2: Kristina Liefke: Logical Approaches to (Compositional) Natural Language Semantics. (Room C009)
2: Barbara Osimani: Exact Replication or Varied Evidence? Reliability, Robustness and the Reproducibility Problem. (Room C016)
4: Lavinia Picollo: Deflationism Broadened. (Room C022)
16:30 - 17:45 Student Poster Sessions. (Adalberthalle)
19:30 Summer School Dinner (Cafe Reitschule).

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Saturday, 30 July

TimeTopic
09:15 - 09:45 Student Presentation: TBA (TBA)
09:45 - 10:15 Student Presentation: TBA (TBA)
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break.
10:45 - 11:15 Student Presentation: TBA (TBA)
11:15 - 11:45 Student Presentation: TBA (TBA)
11:45 - 12:00 Wrap up and closing.

Abstracts

Main Lecture Streams

Semantic Paradoxes and Self-Reference

Roy Cook (University of Minnesota, Twin Cities)

In this series of lectures we will examine what, exactly, a paradox is, and what options we have with respect to responding to these puzzles. We will then look at a number of well-known and lesser-known paradoxes involving semantic notions such as truth and falsity, including the Liar paradox, the Curry paradox, the Yablo paradox, the Open Pair, and others. Special attention will be paid to (i) the role that circularity plays in theorizing about and 'solving' semantic paradoxes, and (ii) the use of non-classical logics in accounts of or solutions to these paradoxes.

The Model Theory of Logical and Mathematical Concepts

Juliette Kennedy (University of Helsinki)

In this philosophy of mathematics lecture series we'll begin with at least two lectures devoted to the problem of logical consequence as articulated by Tarski, and critiqued by Etchemendy and other contemporary philosophers. Other Tarskian themes such as the problem of logicality, as well as the problem of logical constants will also be considered. Subsequent lectures will be devoted to the problem of categoricity, the question whether a theory picks out a unique model; issues arising in the philosophy of set theory; and, time permitting, issues in the philosophy of model theory which go beyond categoricity. In the final lecture of the series we may also consider some recent literature in philosophy of mathematics, which falls outside of the standard paradigms.

Conditional Sentences and Causal Reasoning

Katrin Schulz (University of Amsterdam)

That the meaning of conditional sentences and causal reasoning are closely related seems generally accepted. However, it is still highly debated what the nature of this relation is. Following David Lewis (Lewis 1973) we should define causal dependence based on the meaning of conditionals. Lewis’ proposal came accompanied by an approach to the semantics of conditional sentences, which still dominates the field. Others have argued that the dependency is exactly the other way around (Hiddleston, 2005): conditionals are interpreted based on information about causal dependencies. Such approaches often make use of the Causal Network Approach to causation (Pearl 2000, Spirtes et al. 2000). Goal of this lecture series is to get a good understanding of both positions and the formal models involved. We will see how the research done on both approaches can benefit from insights and results from the other side. We will also have a look at the cognitive evidence for both positions. And, hopefully, we will end up with some answers on what exactly the relation is between conditionals and causal reasoning.

Public Evening Lecture

Intellectual Arrogance and Vanity in Debate and Testimony

Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff University)

Recently political debate has become increasingly ill tempered; displays of arrogance and vanity are widespread, whilst intellectual humility is in short supply. These vices are harmful: morally and epistemically. In this lecture, I develop my view that they flow from one's own evaluations of the intellectual worth of one's character and that these evaluations are guided by the desires to fit within social groups or to defend one's ego. I argue that these vices are often gendered because of their connections to structures of domination and subordination. I show that they are morally harmful because their display is instrumental in the promotion of opposing vices in other individuals. I explore the negative effects that these psychological features have on public debate and on testimony to highlight the epistemic harms that flow from them. Finally, I propose some interventions to reduce the prevalence of arrogance and vanity.

Parallel MCMP Fellows' Sessions' Abstracts

What is Ordinary Mathematics?

Marianna Antonutti Marfori

Both mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics often distinguish between set-theoretic mathematics (that part of mathematics that essentially employs set-theoretic methods and concepts) and ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics [see notably Simpson 2009]. For example, mathematicians often talk about paradoxes arising from self-referential sentences as not being genuinely mathematical problems, and philosophers talk about a certain foundational framework being able to recover ordinary mathematics. In this talk, I will sketch two ways in which this notion can be characterised more precisely: one according to which ordinary mathematics consists of all that mathematics which is directly or indirectly faithfully representable in second order arithmetic, one according to which ordinary mathematical knowledge is the knowledge attainable without using set-theoretic resources (i.e. on the basis of our grasp of second order arithmetic). I will argue that both views run into counterexamples, and I will assess the prospects for formulating an adequate account of the notion of ordinary mathematics.top

Category Theory

Neil Dewar

Various areas of philosophy have started to become interested in the use of category-theoretic tools: roughly speaking, in analysing mathematical structures in terms of the structure-preserving mappings between them. (Thus, the category of groups consists of all groups, together with the group homorphisms between them; the category of vector spaces consists of all vector spaces, together with linear transformations between them; the category of topological spaces consists of all topological spaces, together with continuous transformations between them; and the category of sets consists of all sets, together with functions between them.)

In this talk, I’ll do three things. The first is to provide a basic bluffer’s guide to category theory, outlining the notions needed to engage with a lot of the philosophical applications of category theory (namely categories, functors, natural transformations and categorical equivalence). The second is to articulate some of the mathematical benefits of category-theoretic analysis, especially unification and non-arbitrariness. Finally, I’ll give a sketch of some of the uses to which category theory is being put in contemporary philosophy of science.top

Where Philosophy of Language and Psychology of Reasoning Meet: The Case of Indicative Conditionals

Karolina Krzyżanowska

Indicative conditionals, that is, sentences of the form “If p, (then) q,” belong to the most puzzling phenomena of language: even the most fundamental questions about their semantics and pragmatics are the subject of a contentious debate. In this lecture, I will explore how philosophy, linguistics, and psychology of reasoning can join their forces towards a better understanding of how people interpret indicative conditionals and how they reason with them. Finally, I will discuss limitations and challenges that such an interdisciplinary research has to face.top

Logical Approaches to (Compositional) Natural Language Semantics

Kristina Liefke

Many of the summer school's lecture and tutorials will presuppose the possibility of translating natural language sentences into interpretable logical formulas. This session introduces an explicit procedure for such a translation, along the lines of Montague-style formal semantics. The use of this semantics will enable us to explain the productivity and systematicity of linguistic understanding, to evaluate the truth (or falsity) of natural language sentences (via the truth/falsity of the sentences’ translating formulas), to predict the relation of entailment between sentences, and to explain speakers’ judgements about consistency, presupposition, anaphoric relations, etc. The session will start by observing a mismatch between the grammatical form of disambiguated natural language sentences and the logical form of their predicate-logical translations, and will introduce a typed lambda logic which resolves this mismatch. We will then use this logic for the systematic translation and interpretation of natural language. Finally, we will discuss extensions of Montague-style semantics (esp. hyperintensional semantics and situation semantics), which extend/improve upon the modeling scope of Montague semantics.top

Exact Replication or Varied Evidence? Reliability, Robustness and the Reproducibility Problem

Barbara Osimani

The “Reproducibility Project: Psychology” by the Open Science Collaboration caused some stir among psychologists, methodologists as well as scientists, since less than half of the replicated studies succeeded in reproducing the results of the original ones. The APA has attributed this result to hidden moderators that rendered the replications ineffective. Also publication bias and low power have been identified as possible sources for such mismatch. While some analysts have provided formal confirmation for the plausibility of such explanations (Etz and Vandekerkhove, 2016), others have further insisted on the problem of noisy data and suggested that “to resolve the replication crisis in science we may need to consider each individual study in the context of an implicit meta-analysis” (Andrew Gelman).
I investigate these positions through the lenses of Bayesian epistemology, and in particular of recent results on the Variety of Evidence Thesis, and its diverse versions, by delving in particular on the analysis presented by Bovens and Hartmann (2003), where the interaction of reliability and replication has an essential role in defining the epistemic value of varied evidence vs. replication.
I then present Claveau’s variation of this model (2013), which models unreliability as systematic error (bias), and go on to propose a model, where a distinction is made between random and systematic error (Osimani, Landes, 2017). This delivers results which are in contrast with both Bovens and Hartmann (2003), and Claveau (2013). Although the VET fails in all models, it does so under different conditions in each of them, which are especially linked to how reliability, dependence of observations, and consistency are modeled. This approach turns out to be fruitful in investigating the interaction of reliability, independence of evidence, and replication in scientific inference and, more broadly, casts a new light on the debate between advocates of a pluralist methodology in medical research, who insist on supporting hypotheses through various sources of evidence, and the contending view, represented by the Evidence Based Medicine paradigm, which relies on an “elitist” approach, where “best evidence” is searched for and exact replication is highly welcome.top

Philosophical Problems Concerning Phase Transitions

Patricia Palacios

A topic that has recently attracted the attention of many philosophers of physics concerns the phenomena of phase transitions. Phase transitions are those sudden changes observed, for example, when water turns from liquid into solid. The main philosophical discussion around phase transitions has focused on the apparent need for an infinite idealization in the statistical mechanical treatment of these phenomena. In this lecture, we will discuss the consequences of this infinite idealization for our understanding of reduction, scientific realism and the role of idealizations in scientific theories. At the same time, we will discuss other problems associated with phase transitions such as the notion of universality and the legitimacy of importing models based on phase transitions to other sciences like economics and biology.top

Comprehensive Deflationism

Lavinia Picollo

The core of deflationism about truth is that the truth predicate’s only purpose in natural language is to allow for certain generalisations. Roughly, it enables us to quantify into sentence position. Relying on a nominalisation process that generates a name for each sentence, the truth predicate allows us to replace sentences with talk about sentences, without altering the truth conditions of expressions. Moreover, if a nominalisation process for predicates is available as well, together with certain syntactic operations the truth predicate also enables us to define a satisfaction predicate and, thus, to quantify into predicate position.

Different but structurally similar nominalisation processes can be employed to introduce talk of properties, classes, and propositions into the language. Coupled with this, predicates like property-possession and class-membership, that are governed by principles structurally similar to those that govern the satisfaction predicate, can serve the same expressive purposes as satisfaction. Such structural similarities make deflationism about properties, classes, propositions, property-possession, and class-membership appealing to deflationists about truth.

In my talk I will present this broadened version of deflationism in detail, along with some objections and challenges it must overcome.

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Knowledge of Validity

Luis Rosa

In logic we make statements such as 'Excluded-middle is a logical truth' and 'Modus ponens is logically valid'. These claims are (at least implicitly) universal claims: they are about all sentences or arguments with a certain logical form, where there are infinitely many sentences or arguments sharing that form. So how can we have knowledge of the fact that those claims are true? Certainly it is not any form of a posteriori inductive knowledge, grounded on our verifying that in a certain class of instances sentences with that form were true, much in the same way we come to learn that All ravens are black. It would appear, then, that our knowledge of logical truths is in some sense grounded on pure thought: deductive reasoning plus rational intuitions (if you're a rationalist) or maybe definitions (if you're an empiricist). But can we have knowledge of the fact that certain forms of sentences/arguments are valid without already presupposing that they are so, thus arguing in circles? In this talk we will investigate into the nature of logical knowledge, its purported a priori status and the problem of rule-circularity.top

Student Presentation Abstracts

To be announced.