

Propositional Logic for Epistemic Logic

July 28, 2014

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Propositional logic studies the logical properties of complex propositions (entailment, logical truth, consistency etc.) based on their propositional parts.

The Language of PL

Symbols:

- Propositional letters: $p, q, r, s...$
- Connectives:
 - Unary: \neg
 - Binary: $\wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow$
- Punctuation: $(,)$

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Well-formed formulas (wff):

- 1) Every propositional letter is a wff.
- 2) If ϕ is a wff, then $(\neg\phi)$ is a wff.
- 3) If ϕ and ψ are wffs, so are $(\phi \wedge \psi)$, $(\phi \vee \psi)$, $(\phi \Rightarrow \psi)$ and $(\phi \Leftrightarrow \psi)$.
- 4) Only items received by 1-3 are wffs.

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 &\models_v \phi \Leftrightarrow \psi \text{ iff } \models_v \phi \text{ and } \models_v \psi \text{ or } \not\models_v \phi \text{ and } \not\models_v \psi
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The set of connectives $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow\}$ is *functionally complete*: for all n , any boolean function $f : \{T, F\}^n \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ can be represented by a wff in PL.

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Ex.: Show that $\{\vee, \Rightarrow\}$ is *not* functionally complete.

Semantics

Let Γ be a set of wff's, and let ϕ be a wff.

Γ *entails* ϕ ($\Gamma \models \phi$) if for every valuation function v , if $\models_v \psi$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma$, then $\models_v \phi$.

We shall say that a set Γ of wffs is (*semantically*) *consistent* if there is a valuation v such that $\models_v \psi$ for every $\psi \in \Gamma$.

Proof theory

The system H

Axioms (schemas):

$$\text{P1. } \phi \Rightarrow (\psi \Rightarrow \phi)$$

$$\text{P2. } (\phi \Rightarrow (\psi \Rightarrow \xi)) \Rightarrow ((\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \Rightarrow (\phi \Rightarrow \xi))$$

$$\text{P3. } (\neg\phi \Rightarrow \neg\psi) \Rightarrow (\psi \Rightarrow \phi)$$

Rule of inference:

(MP)

$$\frac{\phi \quad \phi \Rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$$

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If ϕ is provable from Γ , then ϕ is entailed by Γ .

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$$\Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \Gamma \models \phi$$

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$$\Gamma \vdash_H \phi \rightarrow \Gamma \models_{PL} \phi$$

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If ϕ is entailed by Γ in PL , then ϕ is provable from Γ in H .

$$\Gamma \models_{PL} \phi \rightarrow \Gamma \vdash_H \phi$$

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- 'It is necessary that φ '
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- $\Box\varphi$
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- If φ is a wff, so is $\Box\varphi$ ($\Diamond\varphi$)

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- (K) $\Box(\varphi \Rightarrow \psi) \Rightarrow (\Box\varphi \Rightarrow \Box\psi)$

- $KT = PL + N + K + T$
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- $KT4$ (S4)
- $KT5$ (S5)

Semantics

A	$\neg A$
w	f
f	w

A	$\Box A$
w	$?$
f	f

A	$\Diamond A$
w	w
f	$?$

Interlude: relations

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- (Reflexivity) for all x : xRx
- (Symmetry) for all x, y : $xRy \Rightarrow yRx$
- (Transitivity) for all x, y, z : $(xRy \wedge yRz) \Rightarrow xRz$
- (Euclidian) for all x, y, z : $(xRy \wedge xRz) \Rightarrow yRz$
- (Seriality) for all x , there exists y : xRy

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- Relations that are reflexive and transitive are called *preorders*.

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- $w \models_v \Diamond\varphi$ iff for some w' such that $wRw' : w' \models_v \varphi$

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- \mathcal{M} is said to be 'based' on \mathcal{F}

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- $v(p, w'') = F$

- (T) $\Box\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi$ reflexive
- (4) $\Box\varphi \Rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$ transitive
- (5) $\Diamond\varphi \Rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$ Euclidian
- (B) $\varphi \Rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$ symmetric
- (D) $\Box\varphi \Rightarrow \Diamond\varphi$ serial