

Decision Theory, Problem Set #2

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1. **Preference** Suppose that weak preference (\succeq) satisfies the following two constraints.

Transitivity For all a and b , if $a \succeq b$, and $b \succeq c$, then $a \succeq c$.

Completeness For all a and b in the domain of \succeq , either $f \succeq g$ or $g \succeq f$.

Suppose, furthermore, that indifference and strong preference are defined in terms of weak preference as follows.

$a > b$ iff $a \succeq b$ and $b \not\succeq a$

$a \sim b$ iff $a \succeq b$ and $b \succeq a$

Show that indifference and strong preference have the following properties (for all a and b in the domain of $>$ and \sim).

- (a) If $a > b$ and $b > c$, then $a > c$
- (b) If $a > b$ and $b \sim c$, then $a > c$
- (c) If $a \sim b$ and $b > c$, then $a > c$
- (d) If $a \sim b$ and $b \sim c$, then $a \sim c$
- (e) Exactly one of the following holds: $a > b$ or $b > a$ or $a \sim b$

2. **Positive Linear Transformations** Where U is an expected utility function that represents a preference ordering \succeq , and U^* is an expected utility function, show that

- (a) If there exist some real y and positive real x such that, for every a in the domain of \succeq ,

$$U^*(a) = xU(a) + y$$

then U^* represents \succeq .

- (b) If there exist no real y and positive real x such that, for every a in the domain of \succeq ,

$$U^*(a) = xU(a) + y$$

then U^* does not represent \succeq .

3. **Necessary Axioms** Savage showed that every preference relation that satisfies his axioms (which includes the Sure-Thing Principle) can be represented by a probability function and a utility function.

An axiom is *necessary* (in the context of representation theorems for expected utility theory) if it is satisfied by every set of preferences that can be represented by an expected utility function. Is the Sure-Thing Principle necessary? Why or why not?