MCMP Summer School Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students 2017
print


Breadcrumb Navigation


Content

Program

Schedule

Sunday, 27 July

TimeTopic
16:00 - 17:00 Registration.
17:00 - 17:15 Welcome.
17:15 - 18:30 Welcome Lecture: What is Mathematical Philosophy? (Stephan Hartmann & Hannes Leitgeb, MCMP). (Slides, 564 KB)

top

Monday, 28 July

TimeTopic
08:00 - 09:00 Registration.
09:00 - 10:15 Preliminaries for Epistemic Logic (Florian Steinberger & Gil Sagi, MCMP). (Slides, 223 KB; Answers Part 1, 74 KB; Answers Part 2, 91 KB)
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial for 'Preliminaries for Epistemic Logic'.
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break (on your own)
13:30 - 14:45 Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory (Catrin Campbell-Moore & Sebastian Lutz, MCMP). (Slides, 424 KB; Problem Sheet, 209 KB; Problem Sheet with Answers, 292 KB)
14:45 - 15:15 Break
15:15 - 16:30 Tutorial for 'Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory'.
16:30 - 17:00 Break
17:00 - 18:15

Parallel PhD/PostDoc-conducted Sessions:

1: Semantic Paradoxes and Formal Theories of Truth (Lavinia Picollo, Universidad de Buenos Aires).

2: Logical Approaches to Natural Language Semantics (Kristina Liefke, MCMP). (Slides, 2,1 MB)

3: Philosophy of Climate Science (Katie Steele, London School of Economics).

4: (Cooperative) Game Theory and the Social Contract (Johanna Thoma, University of Toronto).

top

Tuesday, 29 July

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs, Australian National University). (Lecture 1, 72 KB; Problem Set 1, 51 kb)
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial for 'Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making'.
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break (on your own)
13:30 - 14:45 Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson, MCMP).
14:45 - 15:15 Break
15:15 - 16:30 Tutorial for 'Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy'.
16:30 - 17:00 Break
17:00 - 18:15 Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets, University of Amsterdam). (Slides for Lectures 1 & 2, 622 KB)

top

Wednesday, 30 July

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Tutorial for 'Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics'.
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00 Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs). (Lecture 2, 71 KB; Problem Set 2, 42 KB)
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break (on your own)
13:30 - 14:45 Tutorial for 'Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making'.
14:45 - 15:15 Break
15:15 - 16:30 Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson).
16:30 - 17:00 Break
17:00 - 18:15 Tutorial for 'Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy'.
19:00 - 20:30 Evening lecture: Women in Philosophy: Why Should We Get More of Them, and How Do We Do It? (Helen Beebee, University of Manchester). (Slides, 211 KB)

top

Thursday, 31 July

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15 Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets).
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00 Tutorial for 'Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics'.
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break (on your own)
13:30 - 14:45

Parallel sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs). (Lecture 3, 75 KB; Lecture 3 Slides, 89 KB;  Lecture 4, 77 KB; Lecture 4 Slides, 152 KB)

Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson).

Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets). (Slides for Lectures 3 & 4, 643 KB)

15:15 - 18:15 Excursion. (Walk to 'Waldwirtschaft')

top

Friday, 1 August

TimeTopic
09:00 - 10:15

Parallel sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs). (Lecture 5, 72 KB; Lecture 5 Slides, 193 KB; Lecture 6, 66 KB)

Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson).

Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets).

10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 12:00

Parallel sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs).

Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson).

Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets).

12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Break (on your own)
13:30 - 14:45

Parallel sessions:

Lecture Stream 1: Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making (Rachael Briggs).

Lecture Stream 2: Agent-based Modeling in Philosophy (Conor Mayo-Wilson).

Lecture Stream 3: Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics (Sonja Smets).

14:45 - 15:00 Break
15:00 - 16:45 Student Poster Sessions.
16:45 - 17:00 Break
17:00 - 18:15

Parallel PhD/PostDoc-conducted Sessions:

1: Using Social Network Analysis in Philosophy
(Catherine Herfeld, MCMP). (Slides, 5,4 MB)

2: Probabilistic Liar Paradoxes (Catrin Campbell-Moore, MCMP).

3: Formal Epistemolgy (Branden Fitelson, Rutgers University).

4: Models and Logical Consequence (Gil Sagi, MCMP).

19:00 Summer School Dinner. (Café Reitschule)

top

Saturday, 2 August

TimeTopic
09:15 - 09:45 Student Presentation: A Qualitative Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens (Chloé de Canson, LSE)
09:45 - 10:15 Student Presentation: The Rationality of Entrenchment Orderings in the AGM Model of Belief Revision (Elizabeth Bell, University of Wyoming)
10:15 - 10:45 Break
10:45 - 11:15 Student Presentation: Metalanguage and Logical Pluralism (Pilar Terrés, Universitat de Barcelona)
11:15 - 11:45 Student Presentation: Alexander Bird’s Characterization of Dispositional Roles (Lisa Vogt, HU Berlin)
11:45 - 12:00 Wrap Up & Closing.

The detailed program of the summer school is also available as printable spreadsheet (PDF, 50kb).


Abstracts

Introduction to Probability Theory, Algebra, and Set Theory

Catrin Campbell-Moore and Sebastian Lutz, MCMP

This introductory lecture provides an overview of basic algebra and set theory that will serve as the basis for the main lecture streams on individual and collective decision theory, agent-based modeling, and epistemic logic. We will introduce the idea of a variable, algebraic operations on variables, and some basic set theory, e.g. union, complementation, domains, ranges, and functions. We will also give an introduction into basic probability theory, such as the characteristics of stochastic variables and independence of stochastic variables, among other issues.

top

Preliminaries for Epistemic Logic

Gil Sagi and Florian Steinberger, MCMP

The aim of this tutorial is to equip the students of the summer school with the necessary logical and set-theoretic tools to ensure their successful participation in the specialized tutorials. We begin with a review of the key notions of propositional and first-order logic (validity, logical consequence, derivability, soundness, and completeness). The second half of the tutorial is devoted to elementary set-theoretic concepts (sets, relations, functions). If time permits, we will end by introducing modal logic.top

Theories of Individual and Collective Decision-Making

Rachael Briggs, Australian National University

This tutorial provides an introduction into individual and collective decision-making. After introducing probabilities and utilities, these lectures will discuss the idea and significance of representation theorems (e.g. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern as well as give a bird's eye view of Leonard Savage and Richard Jeffrey), the issue of causal and evidential decision theory (i.e. Newcomb's Problem, the dominance principle, and other examples that puzzle philosophers). Furthermore, it will provide an introduction to causal modeling and, in particular, Bayesian networks, Causal Markov, and Faithfulness conditions. Bayesianism and frequentism as epistemological approaches will be introduced and various problems surrounding those approaches discussed. Finally, these lectures introduce theory of decision-making under risk and explore the various paradoxes that emerge (e.g. Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes), as well as discuss the Sure Thing Principle and Reduction of Compound Lotteries, present risk-weighted expected utility theory, and money pump arguments for risk-averse agents.

top

Agent-Based Modeling in Philosophy

Conor Mayo-Wilson, MCMP

Computer simulations have become an important tool in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of language, and value theory. In particular, in value theory, simulations of “agent-based models” (ABMs) have been used to investigate the emergence of norms and/or morality. The series of lectures is “practice-based” in the following sense: In addition to discussing contemporary philosophical papers, participants will construct and analyze the types of models that are employed regularly in philosophical debates. To this end, participants will learn how to program in NetLogo, a programming language designed for the construction of ABMs. No previous programming experience is required.

top

Dynamic Epistemic and Doxastic Logics

Sonja Smets, University of Amsterdam

This series of lectures is addressed to students and researchers interested in logics for reasoning about multi-agent belief revision, belief updates, and knowledge updates induced by various forms of communication or interaction. I will start by presenting the main formalisms of Epistemic Logic and Doxastic Logic before moving to "standard" (or "Hard") Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). Next I will argue that standard DEL is appropriate for updating "hard information" (unrevisable knowledge), but that it is inappropriate for "soft information" (possibly false beliefs or defeasible knowledge). Next I move on to "soft" DEL and will present "belief-revision models", defining some important epistemic/doxastic notions and explaining the relevance of these notions to fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology. I will focus in particular on various Belief Update operations and belief-revision policies. Time permitting, I will also cover the long-term dynamics generated by iterated belief revision.top

Women in Philosophy: Why Should We Get More of Them, and How Do We Do It?

Helen Beebee, University of Manchester

In this talk, I present some data on the underrepresentation of women in philosophy in the UK and elsewhere, consider some of the possible reasons for it, and make some suggestions for small, local changes in policies and behaviour that might just begin to make a difference. I focus in particular on the issue of gender stereotype - a phenomenon whose existence and effects are pretty well researched by social psychologists, and which (I shall argue) is highly relevant to the discipline of philosophy.top

A Qualitative Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens

Chloé de Canson, LSE

Fitelson and Hawthorne (2006) argue that a qualitative response to the paradox of the ravens cannot be satisfactory: firstly, they claim that classical deductive logic cannot capture an important distinction needed for Hempel’s solution of the paradox, and secondly, that Hempel’s solution is internally inconsistent. I show that both of these claims rest on a restrictive understanding of Hempel’s solution, and argue that there is a satisfactory qualitative solution to the paradox of the ravens. To conclude, I argue that this solution is not only consistent with Fitelson and Hawthorne’s Bayesian account, but it also enriches it.top

The Rationality of Entrenchment Orderings in the AGM Model of Belief Revision

Elizabeth Bell, University of Wyoming

The AGM model of belief revision claims that in order to rationally revise one's beliefs one ought to give up the less epistemically entrenched belief during revision. However, how a belief became entrenched may not satisfy the rationality standards presupposed in the AGM model. I argue that agents can entrench beliefs in ways that do not satisfy the strict rationality standard presupposed and because of this the entrenchment orderings in the AGM model must be revised in order to be sensitive to the various ways a belief can become entrenched.top

Logic and Metalogic in the relevance solution to the Disjunctive Syllogism

Pilar Terres, Universitat de Barcelona

My aim is to analyze the importance of the notion of metalogic in the discourses about logic. I do this by an analysis of a discussion between Stephen Read and Greg Restall about the Disjunctive Syllogism. The rejection of Ex Falso Quodlibet by relevantists implies the rejection of Disjunctive Syllogism, which seems to be a valid argument. Relevant logicians, as Read (monist relevant logician) and Restall (pluralist relevant logician) have to explain this counterintuitive result. Both Read and Restall accept the invalidity of DS in relevant logic, however, their justification differs as a result of their background theories: Read argues that there is an intensional version of the DS which is valid, in which the disjunction that is used is the intensional disjunction '+', while Restall denies its relevant validity, while accepts it in classical logic. We can see, from these different solutions to the problem, that while Read accepts relevant logic as the one true logic and the logic to reason about logic, Restall sees it as a technical and compelling logic, but not as the all purpose logic (it is a fact that DS preserves truth and does not lead us astray, however, relevant logic fails to capture this fact). In other words, their differences are due to their metalogic and their metalanguage, which determines the all purpose logic one endorses.top

Alexander Bird’s Characterization of Dispositional Roles

Lisa Vogt, HU Berlin

In this talk, I argue that Alexander Bird’s dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature and the identity conditions of properties is based on an overly simple and implausibly uniform characterization of dispositional roles. This deficient characterization prevents him from explaining how fundamental properties are lost as well as how fundamental objects interact. To fix these problems, he would have to postulate additional relations among fundamental properties. However, his account lacks the resources required for this, and making such an assumption would lead to severe problems for his theory.